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Relation between centro-parietal positivity and diffusion model parameters
in both perceptual and memory-based decision making
Marieke K. van Vugt⁎, Marijke A. Beulen, Niels A. Taatgen
Bernoulli Institute of Mathematics, Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence, University of Groningen, Nijenborgh 9, 9747 AG Groningen, The Netherlands
H I G H L I G H T S
• Centro-parietal positivity (CPP) has previously been related to evidence accumulation.• We extend previous perceptual decision studies of the CPP to memory decisions.• We relate the CPP dynamics to model parameters of the drift diffusion model.









A B S T R A C T
Several studies have suggested that the centro-parietal positivity (CPP), an EEG potential occurring approxi-
mately 500ms post-stimulus, reflects the accumulation of evidence for making a decision. Yet, most previous
studies of the CPP focused exclusively on perceptual decisions with very simple stimuli. In this study, we ex-
amined how the dynamics of the CPP depended on the type of decision being made, and whether its slope was
related to parameters of an accumulator model of decision making. We show initial evidence that memory- and
perceptual decisions about carefully-controlled face stimuli exhibit similar dynamics, but offset by a time dif-
ference in decision onset. Importantly, the individual-trial slopes of the CPP are related to the accumulator
model’s drift parameter. These findings help to further understand the role of the CPP across different kinds of
decisions.
1. Introduction
Accumulator models of decision making have been very successful
in accounting for behavioural data in various decision making para-
digms. Well-known members of this class are the Drift Diffusion Model
(Ratcliff, 1978), the Leaky Competing Accumulator Model (Usher and
McClelland, 2001) and the Linear Ballistic Accumulator Model (Brown
and Heathcote, 2008). The common idea of all of these models is that
when we make a decision, we accumulate evidence for each option
until the evidence for one of the options reaches a threshold level, after
which the corresponding choice is executed.
In recent years, researchers have started to investigate how the
evidence accumulation process for decisions manifests in the brain.
Initial suggestions for neural correlates of accumulation processes came
from animal studies that looked at single-neuron activity in the lateral
intraparietal area while monkeys were deciding on the direction of
random dot motion clouds (Gold and Shadlen, 2000; Newsome et al.,
1989). Slightly later various studies using different neuroimaging
modalities in humans followed, which were mostly focused on random
dot motion decisions as well (e.g., Donner et al., 2009; Heekeren et al.,
2008; van Vugt et al., 2012). While the evidence accumulation process
is difficult to observe in functional neuroimaging (Heekeren et al.,
2008; Ploran et al., 2007), electroencephalography (EEG) has a better
temporal resolution on the millisecond scale. There have been several
approaches to examining evidence accumulation in the EEG domain:
focusing on event-related potentials at specific moments in time, or
alternatively the dynamics of brain oscillations or event-related po-
tentials over time. Ratcliff et al. (2009) showed that the amplitude of an
EEG component consisting of a linear combination of various posterior
parietal channels, occurring around 400ms after the stimulus corre-
lated with the amount of decisional evidence during a perceptual de-
cision making task. They could use single-trial classifier estimates to
distinguish trials with low evidence from trials with high evidence.
The problem with focusing only on a specific moment in time is that
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such a study says little about the dynamics of the decision process. For
that reason, van Vugt et al. (2012) examined what brain oscillations
would show a signal dynamics consistent with the accumulation of
evidence over time, and demonstrated that parietal 4–9 Hz theta os-
cillations covaried with the accumulation of evidence during a random
dot motion task. In other words, they found that the power of theta
oscillations increased until the moment of the response in trials in
which there was information to be accumulated, while theta power
stayed flat in control trials in which there was no information to be
accumulated, apart from the stimuli that were being presented. They
also showed that individual differences in the slope of theta oscillations
covaried with individual differences in the drift parameter of the model
fits. Donner et al. (2009) related 12–36 Hz beta oscillations recorded
from the motor cortex with magnetoencephalography to this same
process. Specifically, they showed that beta oscillations increased over
the course of the decision, and predicted the upcoming choice several
seconds before the actual response.
Another neural measure of the decision variable developing in real
time was proposed by O’Connell et al. (2012). In an elegant target
detection task without sudden stimulus onsets they isolated a central-
parietal positive ERP component (the CPP), which peaked at the re-
sponse latency and its rate of rise depended on the difficulty of the
decisions, two key characteristics of a decision variable according to
accumulator models (see also Loughnane et al., 2016). In a similar vein,
Pisauro et al. (2017) examined the dynamics of the CPP in a value-
based decision task, using simultaneous EEG and fMRI. Using each in-
dividual’s average predicted accumulation dynamics, they uncovered a
correlate of evidence accumulation in posterior parietal electrodes that
bears quite some similarity to the CPP, in the sense that it arose from
similar centroparietal areas and peaked at the time of the response after
a gradually increasing trajectory. This EEG signature was associated
with BOLD activity in the posterior medial frontal cortex. This accu-
mulation process was relatively task-general: they found a parietal
electrode cluster to exhibit accumulation-like dynamics in a perceptual
decision making paradigm that was similar to their finding in value-
based decisions.
The work by Pisauro et al. (2017) suggests that the CPP is a rela-
tively task-general correlate of evidence accumulation. This is in
agreement with the original intent of the DDM, which was developed to
explain recognition memory decisions (Ratcliff, 1978) but in recent
times has most often been used to explain simple perceptual decisions
(see Heekeren et al., 2008, and Mulder et al., 2014, for reviews).
Nevertheless, also slightly more complex decisions such as judgments
about whether one has seen an item before, which require a comparison
between evidence presented on the screen and internal memory evi-
dence—“memory decisions” (Donaldson et al., 2009; Donkin and
Nosofsky, 2012; Mack and Preston, 2016)—can be explained with the
same kind of framework. Support for the idea that the CPP reflects a
decision-general process of evidence accumulation comes from nu-
merous studies that have demonstrated that the P300/P3/P3b is a
signal very similar to the CPP (Twomey et al., 2015) in its topography
(centro-parietal), as well as its dynamics (both are a large-amplitude
potential that increases until the response, and peaking around
300–600ms post-stimulus). The P300 is sensitive to the difficulty of
both perceptual (Hillyard et al., 1973; Squires et al., 1975) and memory
tasks (Polich, 2007). In addition, the P300 has been associated with
numerous cognitive processes ranging from computing uncertainty
(Duncan-Johnson and Donchin, 1977) to orienting (Nieuwenhuis et al.,
2005; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2011). Yet, viewed through the lens of ac-
cumulator models of decision making, these difficulty and attentional
modulations could in fact reflect modulations of the drift rate—the
speed of evidence accumulation. Indeed, the P300 (or CPP) has been
found to have a slope roughly sensitive to the amount of evidence ac-
cumulated, and an amplitude changing across task conditions con-
sistent with being a decision threshold (Kelly and O’Connell, 2013;
O’Connell et al., 2012). If the P300/CPP is indeed a domain-general
decision mechanism, then this suggests that it should be observed in
memory-based, value-based and perceptual decisions. Moreover, for the
CPP to be a specific accumulation signature, its dynamics should covary
with model estimates of DDM parameters.
To examine the task-generality of the CPP, we developed a task that
combined a delayed-match-to-sample memory-based decision task and
a same-different perceptual decision making task with face stimuli. In a
delayed-match-to-sample task, participants see a first stimulus
(“memory item”), followed after a delay by a second stimulus (“probe
item”), for which they have to decide whether it is identical (“match”)
or different (“non-match”) from the stimulus just presented. The de-
layed-match-to-sample task is a task that has been used in many
monkey studies of evidence accumulation (Deco et al., 2013; Romo
et al., 2004). While in random dot motion the amount of evidence is
manipulated with the proportion of coherently moving dots, in our
delayed-match-to-sample based on face stimuli, the amount of evidence
is manipulated with the amount of similarity between the two face
stimuli that are being compared. Such a manipulation is possible be-
cause face generation software allows for precise manipulation of in-
formation about faces (e.g., Paysan et al., 2009; Wilson et al., 2002).
Previously, we have shown that such gradations in face similarity affect
decisions about whether an item is a match or a non-match with a re-
membered stimulus (van Vugt et al., 2009; van Vugt et al., 2013).
Specifically, when the probe appears, the participant will retrieve or
refresh their memory of the stimulus items, compare the probe to these
stimuli and use this to drive the evidence accumulation process
(Nosofsky and Palmeri, 1997). The higher the match or similarity be-
tween the probe item and the memory items, the higher the speed with
which the accumulation process drifts towards the thresholds (Nosofsky
et al., 2012). If the CPP is an evidence accumulation signal, it should be
sensitive to the amount of match in each trial, for both perceptual and
memory decisions, and its single-trial behaviour should covary with
estimates of DDM model parameters.
To preview our results, the CPP gradual build-up predicted by ac-
cumulator models is visible for both perceptual and memory decisions,
and—importantly—its slope covaries with estimates of drift parameters
of the DDM in line with the idea that the CPP is a specific reflection of
the evidence accumulation process.
2. Results
2.1. Behaviour
To make the neural correlates of perceptual and memory-based
decision making maximally comparable, we aimed for the perceptual
and memory decision tasks to be of roughly equal difficulty. We did so
by manipulating difficulty by varying the similarity of the face stimuli
(see Methods and Materials). In addition, we made the perceptual task
more difficult by having the faces look outward at an angle. Fig. 1
shows that the difficulty matching between the perceptual and memory
tasks was moderately successful. There was a significant difference in
accuracy between the two tasks with slightly higher accuracy for the
perception task (t(22)=3.4, p < 0.01), although the means of the two
conditions (perception: M=0.82; memory: M=0.78) were not far
apart. The reaction times (RTs) were less comparable. The average RT
for the perceptual task was 1326ms, while the average RT for the
memory task was 824ms, which were significantly different (t
(22)=12.8, p < 0.001). We believe this behavioural difference arises
from to the fact that in the perceptual task, RT is counted from the
moment the two faces come on the screen. Participants first need to
process both faces visually, then mentally rotate them before being able
to make a response, and they may need to make a number of eye
movements to do this. In the memory task, on the other hand, RT is
counted from the onset of the probe face, so that only one stimulus
needs to be encoded before a decision can be made and no rotation and
eye movements are needed.
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This explanation is consistent with the outcome of drift diffusion
model fits (using the DMA Toolbox, VandeKerckhove and Tuerlinckx,
2008). We compared the model fits of models that did not vary any
parameters across tasks (perception vs. memory), models that varied
the non-decision time parameter across tasks, models that varied ad-
ditionally the drift rate, and models that varied additionally the deci-
sion threshold. We found that for 70% of the participants (16 out of 23),
the model that varied the non-decision time had the lowest BIC thereby
suggesting that the differences in behaviour between the perceptual and
memory tasks could best be explained by differences in non-decision
time. The model that allowed non-decision time to vary between the
two tasks fitted the data satisfactorily as judging from predicted versus
observed quantile plots (Supplementary Fig. S1).
As expected, fits of the DDM to each participant’s behavioural data
show that the main difference between the perceptual and memory
decision tasks lies in the non-decision time, which represents time
needed for visual stimulus processing and response preparation. Table 1
contains statistics on the estimates of three key model parameters over
all 23 participants. As this table shows, the estimated drift rate and
decision threshold are by design identical for the two tasks (since we
chose models for which these two did not differ). The non-decision time
is significantly different between the two tasks (t(22)=40.8,
p < 0.001). This non-decision time is nearly 300ms longer in the
perceptual task and may reflect the rotation and eye movement re-
quired in that task. This is consistent with previous work that has shown
that mental rotation can be captured by non-decision time (Provost and
Heathcote, 2015).
Next we checked whether our difficulty manipulation was suc-
cessful. Difficulty firstly was manipulated in a continuous fashion
through the similarities of the stimuli. In the perception task, trials are
more difficult when the two presented faces are more similar. In the
memory task, the difficulty depends on the sum of the similarities be-
tween the probe and each list item (Kahana and Sekuler, 2002;
Nosofsky, 1991). When this sum of similarities is large, participants are
more likely to think the probe item was a member of the just-presented
list. When it is small, participants think the probe item was not a
member of the just-presented list. Consequently, high summed simila-
rities for non-matches make the trial more difficult because they make a
“match” response more likely, while for matches, low summed simila-
rities make the trial more difficult since they make a “non-match” re-
sponse more likely. As Fig. 2 shows, accuracy on non-match trials
gradually decreases with increasing (summed) similarity, as expected.
To examine whether this difficulty manipulation was picked up by
the DDM, we obtained separate drift rate estimates for non-match trials
in four different similarity bins. As (summed) similarity increases, the
participant is more likely to endorse the item as a match, and hence task
difficulty of non-match trials increases with summed similarity, pre-
dicting a lower drift rate for these trials. To test the hypothesis that drift
rate increases with summed similarity, we performed a linear regres-
sion analysis for each participant and compared the resulting regression
coefficients (β) against zero using a t-test. For both the memory and the
perceptual task, we observed a significant negative relation between
(summed) similarity and drift rate (perceptual task: mean β=−1.69,
p < 0.01; memory task: mean β=−1.52, p < 0.001). This indicates
that as expected, increased similarity is associated with greater per-
ceived decision difficulty.
2.2. Relation between CPP and response time
To see whether the CPP component reflects the decision making
process, we looked at its activity on several qualitative measures that
were also used in the original study by O’Connell and colleagues.
Specifically, accumulators should (1) have a slope that scales with re-
sponse time, (2) differentiate correct from incorrect trials, (3) differ-
entiate between easy and difficult trials and (4) predict the upcoming
response. In addition, the slope of the CPP should be informative of a
person’s drift rate. First, examining how the CPP depends on response
time, Fig. 3 shows that the peak of the CPP shifts with increasing re-
sponse time, which is not an artefact of correctness because this analysis
was done only on correct trials. From several hundred milliseconds
after probe onset, there is a significant relation between the amplitude
of the CPP and the eventual response time for each trial. This is con-
sistent with the notion that the build-up of the CPP reflects the devel-
opment of a decision variable. Moreover, when examining the CPP at
the individual-trial level (Fig. 5), it is clear that it peaks right before the
response as well, and therefore the observed relationship with response
time is not an artefact of averaging.
Fig. 1. Reaction times (a) and accuracy (b) of all participants for the perceptual and memory condition. Asterisks indicate significant differences between the two
tasks (dependent samples t-test; **: p < 0.01). The single asterisks indicate outliers in the boxplot.
Table 1
Mean (standard deviation) estimates of drift diffusion model parameters for the
perceptual and memory tasks. Since the best-fitting model had the drift and
decision threshold parameter fixed across the perceptual and memory condi-
tions, those are the same for the two tasks.
Task Drift rate Decision threshold Non-decision time
Perceptual 0.13 (0.06) 0.18 (0.08) 0.70 s (0.13)
Memory 0.13 (0.06) 0.18 (0.08) 0.41 s (0.10)
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2.3. CPP on correct vs. error trials
Next, we examined whether CPP amplitude differentiated between
correct and incorrect trials. Since evidence for the correct response, on
average, is stronger than for the incorrect response, the CPP should be
higher for correct relative to incorrect responses.1 Fig. 4 shows that this
was indeed the case. In the perceptual condition, there was no sig-
nificant difference between CPP amplitude for correct and error trials;
in the memory condition the difference occurred from about 500ms
after probe onset. In agreement with the idea that memory and per-
ceptual decisions exhibit a similar evidence accumulation process,
correct decisions have a larger amplitude than incorrect decisions in
both conditions, although the difference is only significant in the
memory task. Moreover, the difference between the correct and
incorrect signals started to emerge after approximately 500ms for the
memory condition, and in the perceptual condition a numerical (but not
statistical) difference started to emerge after approximately 800ms, in
agreement with their 300-ms difference in non-decision time (Table 1).
2.4. Dependence of CPP on difficulty
According to accumulation models, the build-up of a decision
variable should track the strength of the available evidence, which is
the inverse of trial difficulty. We tested whether the CPP showed a
graded response to our difficulty manipulation, (summed) similarity.
Since the effect of similarity on difficulty is reversed for match com-
pared to non-match trials, and because there is only one similarity value
for match trials in the perceptual task (i.e., a perfect similarity score of
1) we only looked at non-match trials here. As can be seen in Fig. 6, CPP
amplitude is highest on the easiest trials and lowest on the most diffi-
cult ones, while showing an intermediate response on trials of inter-
mediate difficulty. This is consistent with the CPP reflecting a decision
process, and this decision process being similar for perceptual and
memory decisions. As before, the effect was only significant for the
memory decisions. The absence of significance in the perceptual deci-
sion making task could be due to increased variability in that EEG
Fig. 2. Accuracy (probability of endorsing an item as a match in non-match trials) as a function of similarity between the two faces in the perception task (left) and as
a function of summed similarity between probe and all study items in the memory task (right). Error bar indicates standard error of the mean.
Fig. 3. CPP activity for three different reaction time (RT) bins for the perceptual (a) and memory (b) conditions, for only correct trials. Black vertical lines indicate
probe onset; coloured vertical lines indicate the maximum reaction time of each bin. Asterisks indicate a significant correlation between CPP amplitude and reaction
time with p < 0.05, FDR-corrected.
1 Note that this only applies to a full drift diffusion model, which includes the
variability in starting point parameter. Although our model fits do not include
this parameter, the absence of this parameter is only for the purposes of im-
proving the quality of parameter estimation. The theoretical model including
non-decision time is more correct and therefore is used as a basis for making the
qualitative predictions about CPP behavior.
M.K. van Vugt, et al. Brain Research 1715 (2019) 1–12
4
Fig. 4. CPP activity for correct and incorrect trials for the perceptual (a) and memory (b) conditions. Time 0 corresponds to probe onset. Black bars indicate a
significant difference in CPP amplitude between correct and incorrect trials, with corrected p < 0.05.
Fig. 5. Single-trial CPP traces sorted by response time. For both the perception (a) and memory (b) trials, the CPP peaks just prior to the response.
Fig. 6. CPP activity for four different (summed) similarity bins for the perceptual (a) and memory (b) conditions. Lighter colors represent easier (low-similarity)
trials; only non-match trials are included. Time point 0 corresponds to probe onset. The black bar indicates a significant correlation between CPP amplitude and
similarity, with corrected p < 0.05.
M.K. van Vugt, et al. Brain Research 1715 (2019) 1–12
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signal due to the longer average response times in that condition.
2.5. Dependence of CPP on selected response
We then examined whether the CPP is a signed representation of the
accumulated evidence, that is, whether it is higher for one of the re-
sponses than for the other reflecting a decision threshold at different
CPP amplitudes for the two responses. Fig. 7 shows that the CPP indeed
distinguishes between the two responses that were actually chosen and
therefore the CPP may reflect a signed signature of evidence accumu-
lation. From 800 to 1400ms for the perceptual and from 500 to 800ms
for the memory condition, the CPP exhibits higher amplitude for non-
match than for match responses. In other words, the CPP does not only
code for difficulty of the trials and correctness of the responses, but also
the actual identity of those responses. This higher amplitude for non-
match responses is consistent with older studies that showed evidence
that participants adjust their speed-accuracy trade-off between match
and non-match responses. Specifically, in most of those studies the
decision threshold is lower for match than for non-match responses
(Farell, 1985; Ratcliff and Hacker, 1981); similar to what we observed.
2.6. Relation between CPP and model parameters
Finally and crucially, we tested more directly whether the CPP was
related to evidence accumulation by assessing whether its slope was
associated with model parameters fitted on the behavioural data. We
computed CPP slopes on single trials and used that to group the data
into low-neural-drift and high-neural-drift trials. We observed that
trials with a lower neural drift rate (i.e., CPP slope) also had a lower
behavioural drift rate when estimating this parameter separately for the
low- and high-drift rate categories (Fig. 8). The difference between drift
rates for lower CPP slope was significant for both the memory task (t
(22)= 2.78, p=0.01) and the perceptual task (t(22)= 2.16,
p= 0.04). In other words, the CPP does not merely exhibit a dynamics
that is consistent with an accumulator model, but its slope is also
consistent with between-trial differences in accumulator model fits.
There were no differences in the decision threshold between the two
slope groups (t(22) < 0.63, p > 0.53; and a Bayes Factor analysis
confirmed that the slopes are indeed equivalent: BF01= 0.262 for
memory trials and BF01= 0.23 for perception trials).
2.7. Timeline of decision making
Together, this starts to build a timeline of decision making that
complements the work done by Philiastides and Sajda (2007), who
focused more on the beginning of the trial. They showed that around
170ms after stimulus presentation, there was a peak in the EEG asso-
ciated with visual perception (of faces), also reflected in BOLD activity
in the fusiform face area and superior temporal gyrus. Then, around
220ms there was a peak in the EEG associated with trial difficulty, also
associated with BOLD activity in areas such as anterior cingulate cortex
and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. After 300ms, the decision processes
started, associated with activity in lateral occipital complex and ven-
trolateral prefrontal cortex. From our study we can add that around this
time, the CPP starts to also be predictive of response time, followed by
modulation by the amount of evidence and correctness, and finally by
modulation by the identity of the response itself (Fig. 9).
3. Discussion
Our study shows that the centro-parietal positivity (CPP), which was
previously suggested to be a neural correlate of a decision variable
during a perceptual decision making task, exhibits dynamics somewhat
consistent with being a decision variable during more complex deci-
sions. In recognition memory for faces–and to some extent in perceptual
decisions about faces–the CPP satisfies several of the criteria for being
an accumulator that were previously put forward by O’Connell et al.
(2012). Crucially, Fig. 3 showed that there is a significant relation be-
tween CPP amplitude and response latency from several hundred mil-
liseconds into the trial, after initial stimulus processing, and could even
predict response times on a single trial (Fig. 5). O’Connell et al. also
observed that the CPP amplitude was larger for correct responses than
for misses. In our paradigm, there are no misses, but the closest ana-
logues of misses are error responses, which presumably reflect an ac-
cumulation process that moves to the wrong decision threshold. Indeed,
we observed that the CPP exhibited a stronger response on correct than
on incorrect trials for the memory decisions (Fig. 4), as well as a graded
decrease in response amplitude from easy to difficult trials in the
memory decisions (Fig. 6). The CPP also predicted which response
(match or non-match) a participant was going to make later in the trial
for both perceptual and memory decisions (Fig. 7). In general, the CPP
looked similar for perceptual and memory decisions, although the
process was delayed by approximately 300ms for the perceptual task
due to a longer stimulus processing time. The significant effects are
summarized in Fig. 9. Interestingly, the CPP is predictive of response
time from quite early in the trial. After that, it starts to be predictive of
the amount of evidence available for decisions, as well as whether the
person will get the trial correct, and finally, the CPP starts to predict the
Fig. 7. CPP activity for ‘match’ versus ‘nonmatch’ responses for the perceptual (a) and memory (b) conditions. Time point 0 corresponds to probe onset. Black bars
indicate a significant difference in CPP amplitude between the two responses, with corrected p < 0.05.
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actual response given. Overall, the CPP effects occur later for the per-
ceptual condition relative to the memory condition, most likely because
these trials have a non-decision time that is approximately 300ms
longer, as we demonstrated with our drift diffusion model fits (Table 1).
Importantly, further supporting a role for the CPP in evidence accu-
mulation, we found that the CPP covaries with within-individual dif-
ferences in model parameters (Fig. 8). Together, the fits and the timing
diagrams suggest that the accumulation process for perceptual and
memory decisions is quite similar to the extent that significant effects
could be observed in the perceptual decision condition. However, the
process is delayed by approximately 300ms in perceptual decisions.
The longer response time for the perceptual decisions may also be the
reason that the CPP is not as predictive in the perceptual task as in the
memory task, since evoked potentials become more noisy the farther
they are away from the event to which they are time-locked. In sum-
mary this suggests that there is initial evidence that the CPP is a do-
main-general EEG potential that is sensitive to the evidence accumu-
lation process involved in making decisions, although several of the
criteria for neural accumulators are only satisfied by the shorter-dura-
tion memory decisions and not by the longer-duration perceptual de-
cisions.
Our study has several limitations. First and foremost, the tasks used
in our comparison of perceptual and memory decisions turn out to be
not ideal. While they both make use of the same stimuli, response times
are significantly longer in the perceptual task, most likely due to the
need to rotate the stimuli before making a decision. This means that
effectively an extra task stage is added to the task which makes it more
challenging to compare the dynamics of the memory and perceptual
decision conditions. The longer response times for the perceptual de-
cisions also mean that the relevant CPP signal was further away from
the stimulus onset, and therefore more noisy. It is therefore not strange
that in several of the statistical tests, the hypothesized difference was
only significant for the memory decisions and not for the perceptual
decisions. Future research should replicate the CPP paradigm using
tasks in which the response times and accuracies are more closely
aligned.
Second, given that analysing the face stimuli involves comparing
different parts of the face, a potential worry is that our EEG may be
contaminated by a substantial number of eye movements, especially for
the perceptual decisions. However, these eye movements occur pri-
marily before the signal of interest, the CPP, takes off. In other words,
these eye movements may dominate in earlier perceptual stages, and
primarily in frontal electrodes that do not contain the CPP (Dimigen
et al., 2011). Moreover, the amount of eye movements in our paradigm
is probably not substantially different from that in visual search, for
which P300 potentials—which are similar to the CPP—are routinely
reported (Busch and Herrmann, 2003; Luck and Hillyard, 1994).
Moreover, most eye movements were removed from the EEG data using
independent component analysis (ICA), such that in principle their ef-
fects should have been minimized.
O’Connell et al. (2012) first identified the CPP in a very simple
signal detection task and later described its activity in the classic
random dot-motion task (Kelly and O’Connell, 2013). These studies
established that the CPP is independent of stimulus identity or response
implementation. We have taken this a step further and shown that the
CPP still reflects the build-up of a decision variable when participants
are deciding about complex face stimuli rather than simple perceptual
information. In addition, the CPP responds similarly to trials in which
Fig. 8. Drift parameters of trials that were grouped by CPP slope. Different colours indicate different participants. There is a larger drift rate for trials with higher CPP
slope for both the perception (left) and memory (right) conditions.
Fig. 9. Summary of the timing of the significant task effects on the CPP for the
perceptual condition (darker top bars) and memory condition (brighter bottom
bars). From top to bottom: response time effects (from Fig. 3), correctness ef-
fects (from Fig. 4), evidence effects (from Fig. 6), and response effects (from
Fig. 7).
M.K. van Vugt, et al. Brain Research 1715 (2019) 1–12
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the information that is accumulated is retrieved from memory as when
it is derived from sensory input, and its magnitude is related to DDM
model parameters. This evidence for accumulation processes in re-
cognition memory is in line with several other recent studies which
have taken the perspective that information retrieved from memory can
be accumulated the same way as other decision input (e.g., Gluth et al.,
2013; Kira et al., 2015) and that accumulator models can be used to
describe memory-based decisions as well (Mack and Preston, 2016;
Rutishauser et al., 2015).
Our study differs from earlier studies of the CPP in decision making
in that our CPP does not go up to a fixed amplitude, which some argue
is a requisite property of an accumulator (O’Connell et al., 2012; Purcell
et al., 2010). For example, Purcell et al. (2010) have shown that in the
frontal eye field the time at which neural activity reaches a fixed
threshold determines response times, and O’Connell et al. (2012)
showed that the CPP reaches a fixed level in their task. In addition,
there is abundant evidence for adaptations of thresholds in the context
of speed-accuracy trade-offs (Luce, 1986), and other studies have
shown different final firing levels depending on the level of speed-ac-
curacy trade-off in neurons in motor cortex (Heitz and Schall, 2012).
We too have previously demonstrated with both modelling and elec-
trophysiology (van Vugt et al., 2014) that in task conditions differing in
decision thresholds, the neural accumulators (in that case measured by
the Lateralized Readiness Potentials) differ correspondingly. Indeed,
recent work by Steinemann et al. (2018) suggested that the change in
CPP amplitude with response time and with shifts in speed-accuracy
trade-off could potentially reflect collapsing boundaries (Drugowitsch
et al., 2012). One could say that the potential is pushed down by the
urgency signal, which would be larger for longer response times,
thereby creating a lower amplitude for longer response times compared
to shorter response times, as we observed (Fig. 3). Although a model
which incorporates a collapsing bound is thus an interesting candidate
model for our data, the relatively small amount of data does not allow
us to obtain reliable fits for these models. For this reason, we have done
our model fits using the pure DDM which only includes the main model
parameters drift rate, non-decision time, and decision threshold (setting
other parameters such at variability in drift rate to zero).
As mentioned above, a recent study (Twomey et al., 2015) has
shown strong similarities between this signal and the classic P300
component found in event-related potentials (ERPs) during oddball-
tasks. P300-like components (e.g., P3b) are also found ubiquitously in
the working memory/short-term memory literature. For example,
Morgan et al. (2008) showed that in a face recognition task very similar
to ours, the P300 amplitude decreased with study list length. Con-
sidering that evidence accumulation is expected to go slower on more
difficult trials, this is consistent with the P300 reflecting a developing
decision variable. Perhaps our extension of the CPP into the realm of
recognition memory and face matching tasks will help to shed more
light on the role of the P300 in these tasks as well.
Another slow potential that is similar to the CPP is the Contingent
Negative Variation (CNV). It has been suggested that the CNV reflects
an accumulation process, albeit an accumulation of time instead of an
accumulation of decision evidence (Macar and Vidal, 2003; Ng et al.,
2011; but see Kononowicz and van Rijn, 2014). The CNV is sensitive to
a multitude of factors, including motivation, attention, task difficulty
(Tecce, 1972). The CNV is in most studies associated with an EEG signal
in more frontal electrodes than CPz (but see Macar and Vidal, 2003),
and does not always go up until the moment of the response. Moreover,
unlike the CPP, which is time-locked to the imperative stimulus, the
CNV is typically defined as a potential that starts from the moment of a
warning cue that precedes the imperative stimulus, continues while
that stimulus is presented and then goes back to baseline at the moment
of the motor response. It is therefore unlikely that the CPP and the CNV
reflect the same decision signal.
We have previously reported that the amplitude of 4–9 Hz theta
oscillations tracks a decision variable in perceptual decisions about
random dot motion (van Vugt et al., 2012). In fact, it could very well be
that the CPP studied arises from the same origin as theta oscillations.
This is a particularly attractive idea given that several previous studies
have suggested links between the P300 and theta oscillations (Basar-
Eroglu et al., 1992; Klimesch et al., 2000).
The large-scale CPP signal that is consistent with evidence accu-
mulation suggests it should be easy to find a neural correlate of evi-
dence accumulation in electrocorticography (ECoG) signals, which
have a much higher spatial resolution. Interestingly, we also searched
for neural accumulation signals in a recognition memory task similar to
the one represented here in ECoG data from epilepsy patients. In that
case, we did not find overwhelming evidence for a neural accumulator
signal (van Vugt et al., 2017; van Vugt et al., 2016). There are several
potential reasons for failing to find a clear signal in these studies, even
though the task was quite similar to the memory condition in the
findings we present here. First of all, the participants in our ECoG study
were all epilepsy patients with performance that is much more variable
than healthy participants, thereby making it more difficult to find
evidence for any effect. In addition, that study had relatively poor
coverage over superior parietal and motor areas, which may have re-
duced chances of observing an electrocortical manifestation of the CPP/
P300.
In sum, we have shown initial evidence that the CPP behaves as a
developing decision variable in these more complex decision making
tasks, similar to what was previously observed in other tasks. While the
results were quite consistent for memory decisions, they often failed to
reach significance in the slower perceptual decisions. We further
showed that the slope of the CPP could distinguish between trials with
low and high drift rates and correlated with model estimates. Together,
this is in line with the idea that the CPP reflects the process of evidence
accumulation, and it suggests that the brain uses a similar mechanism
for both perceptual and memory decisions. Future research should re-
plicate these findings in a situation where the two tasks being compared
are more similar in their response times and accuracies.
4. Methods and materials
4.1. Participants
Participants were recruited in the city of Groningen and participated
in return for a monetary reward. From a total of 23 participants, 11
were female. Ages ranged from 17 to 36 with a mean of 23.9 and a
standard deviation of 4.2. All participants had normal or corrected-to-
normal vision, and all were right-handed. Informed consent was ob-
tained before testing. The protocol was approved by the Ethical
Committee of the Department of Psychology at the University of
Groningen and was conducted in accordance with the Declaration of
Helsinki. Participants were paid €10 per hour for their participation,
plus a bonus based on the number of points they obtained in the task
(typically around €7).
4.2. Stimuli
Our experiment consisted of alternating blocks of two tasks. In the
perceptual decision making task participants saw two images of a face
on the screen, each facing outward (see Fig. 10(b) for an example), and
were asked to decide whether these two faces represented the same
person. In the recognition memory task shown in Fig. 10(a), partici-
pants studied two faces (which made up the memory set) and main-
tained those faces over a variable delay period of several seconds. After
this delay, they were shown a test face (the probe), for which they
needed to indicate whether or not it matched one of the two studied
faces.
The images of faces we presented were created using the Basel Face
model (Paysan et al., 2009). Based on 3D-scans of 200 real faces, this
Matlab toolbox makes it possible to generate synthetic faces, which
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differ from an average face by a desired distance. We used this model
because it captures many different attributes of faces and yet can be
reduced to a set of principal components and their standard deviations.
These principal components can then be varied to create a set of face
stimuli that systematically covers a region of face space. In this case,
our faces were defined by varying the first three principal components
(PCs) of this face space. For the memory task, we used the space
spanned by three standard deviations above and below the average face
(i.e., the set of vectors comprising all possible combinations of the va-
lues [−3, 0, 3]). The use of standard deviations ensured that the per-
ceived magnitudes of change on each PC would be comparable. This
gave us a set of 27 different faces, with varying degrees of similarity
between them that can be quantified as vector distances (e.g., face
[−3−3−3] is very similar to face [−3−3 0] but maximally dissim-
ilar to face [3 3 3]).
We aimed for the two tasks to be comparable in difficulty. A be-
havioural pilot experiment showed that if the same faces were used in
both tasks, performance in the perceptual task was significantly better
than in the memory task. Therefore, we created a set of faces for the
perceptual task where each PC was only varied by two standard de-
viations (i.e., [−2, 0, 2]), which made them more difficult to dis-
criminate. In addition, we made the task more challenging by showing
the two faces in the perceptual task facing different directions, rather
than two identical images facing ahead. This had the added advantage
that participants were encouraged to process the faces holistically, ra-
ther than comparing the two images as abstract stimuli.
4.3. Procedure & design
Participants were awarded a point for every correct trial, which at
the end of the experiment was converted into a monetary reward.
Because instructions to minimize response time while maximizing
accuracy are typically very confusing to participants, we followed the
methods used by van Vugt et al. (2012) and Simen et al. (2009), in
which participants were given the instruction to trade off their speed
and accuracy such that they would maximize their points in every block
of four minutes. In other words: if they made faster decisions, they
could do more trials in four minutes and therefore potentially acquire
more points. However, if they decided too quickly, they would make
many mistakes, and therefore not get as many points. Participants were
allowed to take a brief pause between blocks. To obtain enough trials of
both tasks, two blocks of the (longer) memory task were followed by
one block of the perceptual task, and this cycle was repeated four times.
Fig. 10(a) shows an example trial of the perceptual face dis-
crimination task. Each trial of this task started with a 500ms pre-
sentation of a fixation cross. After this, there was a wait period during
which the screen was blank. The duration of this period was jittered
between 700 and 775ms (drawn from a uniform distribution), to avoid
accidental temporal correlations between task events and on-going
oscillations in the EEG. After the wait period, two faces were shown,
each facing outward. Participants could respond as soon as the images
appeared on the screen. They were instructed to press an M using their
right hand if they thought the two faces were the same, and a Z using
their left hand if they thought the faces were different. After the deci-
sion, feedback on accuracy and reaction time was presented for 500ms.
Then, after a 400–475ms wait, the next trial started automatically.
In the memory decision task, participants needed to remember two
faces over a delay period and then compare them to a test face. An
example trial is shown in Fig. 10(a). Again, each trial of this task started
with a 500ms fixation stimulus period followed by a 700–775ms blank
wait screen. After this, the memory set was presented for
2000–2075ms. Both faces in the memory set were shown at the same
time. This was followed by a 1000–1150ms blank delay period, after
which the probe was shown until the participant responded. The
Fig. 10. Example trials of the perceptual (b) and memory-based (a) decision making condition.
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response, again, was indicated by an M for a match, and a Z for a non-
match. Feedback was shown for 500ms and then a blank screen was
shown for 400–475ms until the automatic onset of the next trial. The
experiment was presented using the software E-Prime (Psychology
Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA). The task can be downloaded here:
https://figshare.com/articles/Face_Sternberg_task_E-prime_/5817420.
All participants performed the same 12 blocks of trials, but the order
of blocks was randomized for each participant with the constraint of
two memory blocks being followed by one perceptual block. Each block
was constructed in such a way that half of the trials (randomly chosen)
were match trials (i.e., the two faces were the same in the perceptual
task, or the probe item was part of the memory set in the memory task)
and the other half were non-match trials. The study set in the memory
task always consisted of two different faces, and match probes were
identical to either the left or the right study item on an equal number of
trials. Furthermore, to avoid confusion due to recency, the same face
could not appear on two occasions less than three trials apart. Within
these restrictions, items were randomly assigned to trials.
4.4. Behavioural analysis
We computed average response time and fraction of correct trials.
No outliers were removed. Average accuracies and response times
across participants were compared between the memory and perceptual
decision making task by means of a paired t-test. The DDM was fit with
the DMA toolbox (VandeKerckhove and Tuerlinckx, 2007, 2008). Every
participant was fitted individually, and only drift, decision threshold
and non-decision time were allowed to vary between task conditions
(memory versus perceptual task). The starting point of evidence accu-
mulation was kept fixed halfway between the two decision thresholds.
This version of the DDM, the “pure DDM” has previously been shown to
be more stable than DDMs in which all parameters vary with condi-
tions. Response times more than 3 standard deviations from the mean
were removed before fitting the model. The model was fitted by mini-
mizing the discrepancy between modelled and empirical response time
distribution quantiles (10, 30, 50, 70, 90), with a chi-squared mini-
mization procedure. For 16 out of 23 participants, the pure DDM model
in which only the non-decision time varied between the conditions fit
the data significantly better according to a Bayesian Information Cri-
terion (BIC) than models in which no parameters were allowed to vary
between the two conditions (perception versus memory), as well as
models in which only the drift rate, or only the threshold varied be-
tween the perception and memory conditions, or more complex models
in which non-decision times together with drift and/or decision
thresholds varied with conditions.
For our analysis of a potential relation between CPP slope and DDM
parameters (see below), we divided the trials into a group of low and
high slopes. We then considered the low- and high-slope trials to be
separate conditions in the DDM fit (thereby increasing the number of
conditions to four: low-slope perceptual trials, high-slope perceptual
trials, low-slope memory trials, high-slope memory trials). For these
model fits, we again chose for the pure DDM, which allowed us to ex-
amine what parameters (drift, threshold, non-decision time) differed
between the low- and high-slope trials.
Most statistics were done with the Statistics toolbox in Matlab, but
Bayes Factors were computed in JASP (Wagenmakers et al., 2017).
Bayes Factors allowed us to verify whether the absence of significant
results reflected the true absence of a difference between conditions, or
alternatively, whether the data were too noisy to say anything about
this comparison.
4.5. EEG recordings
EEG activity was measured using 30 tin scalp electrodes (Electro-
Cap International) placed according to the 10/20 system. In addition,
vertical and horizontal EOG activity and both mastoids were measured.
Impedances were kept below 10kΩ for all electrodes. Activity was
amplified and filtered using the Refa system (TMS International BV)
and digitized at a sampling rate of 500 Hz using the software Portilab
(TMS International BV).
After recording, data were re-referenced to the average of the
mastoids and a bandstop filter was applied around 50 Hz to remove line
noise. Artifacts were identified using three criteria. First, trials where an
electrode’s normalized amplitude exceeded 3.5 standard deviations
from the group mean (calculated across all electrodes and trials for each
participant) were excluded from analysis for that electrode. The same
was done for trials where the signal’s kurtosis exceeded 4.5 (Delorme
and Makeig, 2004), or its variance was more than 1.75 standard de-
viations above the group mean. These thresholds were determined
empirically by optimizing removal of visually identified artifacts in a
subset of participants and then applied uniformly to all data. Finally,
electrodes that contained artifacts on more than 50% of trials were
excluded from further analysis entirely, and the same was done for
trials in which more than 50% of electrodes contained artifacts. This led
to the complete removal of approximately 5.4% of channels, and 8.0%
of trials, across all participants. In addition, an average of 5.6 out of 30
channels were removed from individual trials due to incidental arti-
facts. Eye artifacts were removed by decomposing the data into in-
dependent components (as implemented in the Fieldtrip software), then
removing components with a time course and topography suggestive of
blinks or saccades, and finally recomposing the EEG using the re-
maining components.
4.6. EEG analysis
Data analysis was performed using the FieldTrip toolbox for EEG
analysis (Oostenveld et al., 2011). Prior to analysis, the EEG signal was
baseline corrected using the 300ms before the probe stimulus onset as a
baseline. In line with O’Connell et al. (2012), the centro-parietal posi-
tivity was defined as the average signal at electrode CPz and two of its
neighbours, CP1 and CP2.
To examine whether CPP amplitude could predict reaction time
(RT) on individual trials, and at which points in the trial this was the
case, we averaged the time courses of electrodes CPz, CP1 and CP2 and
performed a linear regression between the amplitude of this signal and
RT for each time sample of each participant’s data. We then used for
each time one-sample a t-test to compare the regression coefficients of
all participants against zero. A false discovery rate (FDR) procedure
(Benjamini and Hochberg, 1995) was applied to the resulting p-values
to correct for multiple comparisons. This resulted in a range of time bins
for which there was a significant correlation between CPP amplitude
and subsequent reaction time. While our preferred method for the
correction for multiple comparisons is the cluster-based approach de-
scribed in the next paragraph, this cluster-based method works only in
Fieldtrip for comparisons between groups, and not for a regression. For
this reason we resorted to FDR for this analysis, while we used cluster-
based multiple comparison corrections for the other analyses.
To test if and when CPP amplitude could distinguish between cor-
rect and error trials, we performed an independent samples t-test
comparing the average of the correct and error trials at each time
sample on the EEG signal of the three CPP electrodes. Correction for
multiple comparisons was performed using a cluster-based method
(Maris and Oostenveld, 2007). Specifically, the t-statistics were binar-
ized using a significance threshold corresponding to a p-value of 0.05,
after which they were clustered in space (the three neighbouring
channels) and time. Neighbours were defined with the Fieldtrip tem-
plate elec1010_neighb.mat, and the minimum number of channels in a
cluster was set to one. Each cluster was characterized by the sum of the
t-statistics comparing the average correct and error CPPs for each
participant. These summed t-statistics were then compared to clusters
of t-statistics obtained from a Monte Carlo simulation with 10,000
iterations for which in each iteration, the difference between correct
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and error CPPs for each participant was randomly flipped in sign. This
resulted in a range of time samples at which CPP amplitude was sig-
nificantly different between whether or not the upcoming response was
correct.
A similar method was used to examine whether CPP amplitude
significantly differentiated between trials with different degrees of
difficulty. Trials of both tasks were divided into four bins based on their
(summed) similarity values (which determines task difficulty and
therefore should change the speed of the accumulation process). For the
perceptual task, the difficulty was simply the degree of similarity (be-
tween 0 and 1) between the two faces shown. For the memory task, we
used as difficulty measure the sum of the similarities between the probe
item and each of the two items in the memory set. Since there is only
one value of similarity for match probes in the perceptual task (i.e., 1:
the two faces are identical), we only used non-match trials of both tasks
for this comparison. Significance was determined on the CPP signal
averaged per category within each subject using the same Monte Carlo
method described for correct and incorrect trials, the only difference
being the use of a multivariate F-test instead of a t-test because in this
case four categories were being compared (rather than two).
In supplementary Figs. S2–S4, we show response-locked CPPs.
Those were created on the basis of the stimulus-locked CPPs, which
were shifted in time such that they were all aligned to the moment of
the response. We chose the duration of the trials on the basis of the
average response time of the respective task conditions.
To determine whether the CPP amplitude was in fact predictive of
accumulation activity, we examined the relation between CPP slope
and model parameters. If the CPP is an accumulation process, then
more shallow slopes should be associated with lower DDM drift rates
than steeper slopes. For this reason, we computed the slope of the CPP
between the moment of response and 300ms before that on each in-
dividual trial, and used that to separate the trials into low slopes and
high slopes (analogous to the methods used in Ratcliff et al. (2009) but
now with slopes instead of classifier amplitudes on a single time point).
We then compared parameter estimates between the shallow-slope and
steep-slope trials across all participants with a dependent-samples t-test
to assess whether there was a difference in drift rate between shallow-
slope and steep-slope trials, as there should be if the CPP reflects the
evidence accumulation process.
EEG data (in Fieldtrip format after preprocessing) and behavioural
data (in matlab structs) can be downloaded from https://unishare.nl/
index.php/s/CNNUyD3r16ZC5hy.
Appendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at https://
doi.org/10.1016/j.brainres.2019.03.008.
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